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 As the internet becomes integrated into citizens’ everyday life, many casual 
opportunities to engage in political talk take place online. With the rise of social media, scholarly 
attention to online political talk has shifted from formal political discussion forums to informal 
spaces where political discussion is not the main purpose (Graham 2010, 2012; Himelboim et al. 
2012). In these latter situations, political talk emerges from other social activities and interests 
(e.g., entertainment) and can expose its participants to a variety of perspectives.  
The interest surrounding political talk online is well justified. Informal political 
conversation is a core activity in modern democracies that enables citizens to learn about topics 
of public concern, engage with their communities, build shared values, as well as to build, 
understand, and negotiate both personal and collective identities (Moy and Gastil 2006; Wyatt, 
Katz, and Kim 2000). Although a substantial body of research has examined the potential 
benefits of political talk, scholars become skeptical when these conversations take place in 
digital environments given the uncivil discourse they breed (Anderson et al. 2014; Coe, Kenski, 
and Rains 2014; Rowe 2015). While these concerns are not unjustified, most research on online 
incivility has focused on the presence of certain behaviors, with little attention to the extent to 
which this type of discourse targets particular groups and individuals, or is used to express 
opinions (Coe, Kenski, and Rains 2014; Gervais 2014). As such, these studies appear to assume 
that incivility online is inherently offensive, without examining whether participants actually 
engage with and target each other in uncivil interactions. In other words, to understand if and 
how antinormative discourse may target distinct groups online, we must distinguish interpersonal 
offense from opinion expression and, more important, from behaviors that threaten democratic 
values.  
Following a stream of research advocating for a nuanced understanding of incivility, 
which considers that some forms of incivility might be acceptable or perceived as inoffensive in 
online political talk (Kenski, Coe, and Rains 2017; Papacharissi 2004), this chapter focuses on 
identifying the conditions in which certain people or groups are targeted by uncivil vs. intolerant 
discourse. Specifically, what contextual and discursive features are associated with targeting 
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others –either participants in a discussion or external actors –when discussing political affairs 
online? This study analyzes comments on political stories on Facebook and news websites in 
Brazil. As communication online is structured by platform affordances, the study also examines 
the relationship between these two discussion environments and the focus of uncivil and 
intolerant discourse on different targets.  
In examining the contextual and the conversational dynamics around antinormative 
discourse, this chapter provides a framework that enables future research to distinguish situations 
in which online discussions are inherently toxic and threatens democratic values from those 
where participants are expressing their opinions more aggressively when discussing politics. This 
study finds that much of the vitriol online is targeted at political actors and characterized by 
elaborated opinion expression, suggesting that those who discuss politics online might adopt a 
critical tone towards the political sphere. When comments target other participants in a 
discussion, they are more likely to be uncivil than intolerant, and to signal disagreement – 
suggesting a heterogeneous conversation environment. Finally, comments targeted at minorities 
are more likely to be intolerant and to emerge in homogeneous discussion threads, suggesting 
that the targets of these comments are either absent from the discussion or silenced by the 
perception of a hostile opinion environment. Taken together, these findings indicate that while 
incivility is not inherently associated with interpersonal offense nor should be considered a 
problematic feature of online political talk, intolerant discourse emerges precisely when it may 
hurt democracy the most by targeting minorities and disenfranchised groups in relatively 
homogeneous discussions when they are the topic of a news story, contributing to further 
exclusion of their voices. 
Incivility and Online Political Talk  
Scholars such as John Dewey ( 1927), Jurgen Habermas (1996) and Benjamin Barber 
(2003), have emphasized the role of informal political talk as a fundamental practice in 
democratic societies. Their perspective inspired a substantial body of research examining the 
democratic value of informal political talk, and scholars have examined both intrinsic and 
extrinsic benefits associated with everyday political conversation (Conover and Searing 2005; 
Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini 2009). For instance, citizens who engage in political talk are able to 
refine their own arguments and better understand others’ perspectives, have higher levels of 
political knowledge and efficacy (Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008), and are more likely to be 
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politically engaged (Gil de Zúñiga, Valenzuela, and Weeks 2016; Jacobs, Cook, and Carpini 
2009). Ultimately, informal political talk enables citizens to learn, elaborate, and refine opinions, 
perspectives, interests, and values that contribute to form social and individual identities, and 
enable them to understand and yield meaning to political facts and matters of public concern 
(Walsh, 2004).  
As social interactions take place increasingly in online environments, scholars have 
voiced concerns about the value of online political talk. Some have argued that the internet fails 
to promote democratically relevant political conversation due to the excessive presence of 
incivility and to the lack of accountability of discussion participants (Hill and Hughes 1997; 
Santana 2014). However, the presence of uncivil discourse, as well as of trolls – users who 
purposefully intend to obstruct discussion and upset others – in computer-mediated interpersonal 
interaction is as old as the use of the internet for communication through email and bulletin-
board systems (BBSs), even before commercial use (Mabry 1997; Phillips 2016). Incivility can 
be found in nearly any venue where people discuss politics online, with some of the most heavily 
researched sites being online forums and the comments section of news websites (Papacharissi 
2004; Rowe 2015; Santana 2014). Regardless of how incivility may be conceptualized, 
researchers have consistently found these behaviors online – on news sites (Coe, Kenski, and 
Rains 2014), Usenet discussion groups (Papacharissi 2004), and social media such as Facebook 
(Rowe 2015). 
Moreover, incivility online have notable effects. For instance, uncivil comments may 
increase risk perception and polarization around nanotechnology (Anderson et al. 2014), though 
these effects are mediated by prior issue knowledge and religious beliefs. Incivility in blog posts 
can motivate readers to participate in the comments section when controversial topics are framed 
in ways that affect personal values, but it may also increase polarization (Borah 2014). As well, 
exposure to uncivil comments may trigger greater incivility in polarized political issues (Gervais 
2014). However, this incivility tends to be perceived as acceptable when it aligns with their 
views. Uncivil comments are also perceived as less persuasive in the context of disagreement 
about abortion (Chen and Ng 2016). Overall, incivility online may affect people’s willingness to 
participate in discussions, as well how individuals form opinions, process, and interpret 
information. However, most studies have focused on discussions around specific – and often 
controversial – topics, which cannot be generalized to most informal political debates. Moreover, 
researchers do not have a shared understanding of what incivility is and how it should be 
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characterized. In this context, this chapter aims to contribute to the challenge of understanding 
incivility online by focusing on how antinormative behaviors target particular individuals or 
groups.  
1 Toward a better understanding of antinormative behavior online 
Despite the generalized concerns around incivility and the vigorous body of research 
dedicated to the topic, the concept is notoriously hard to define (Jamieson et al. 2015). One 
reason for this challenge is that incivility “lies in the eye of the beholder” (Herbst 2010, p.3), 
suggesting that the perceptions of what is uncivil may vary as interaction norms are flexible and 
contextual. For scholars aligned with deliberative theories, civility is the ability to recognize 
discussion partners as equals, whose opinions are legitimate and worthy of respect even in the 
context of disagreement (Habermas 1996; Jamieson et al. 2015). To some extent, most 
definitions share a notion of incivility as lack of respect towards other people and their views. 
The fuzziness around the concept of incivility and its operationalization poses a challenge for 
comparing research results (Stryker, Conway, and Danielson 2016). 
Yet incivility is a communicative practice – one that may serve a rhetorical purpose in a 
discussion (Benson 2010; Herbst 2010). In this perspective, incivility is sensitive to flexible 
norms of interaction and depends on contextual factors – e.g. a commentary that is acceptable 
among friends might be inappropriate in the workplace. Considering incivility as a 
communicative practice, rather than a normative violation, means accepting that different types 
of incivility exist and that they may serve strategic purposes in discourse (Rossini forthcoming). 
Specifically, while incivility can be a rhetorical asset that people choose to evoke to express their 
opinions, intolerance comprises inherently harmful behaviors that threaten democratic values 
such as freedom and equality (Gibson 2007; Honneth 1996). While incivility refers to the use of 
rude remarks, name-calling, personal attacks, pejorative expressions, profanity and vulgarity, 
intolerance encompasses attacks on individual liberties and rights, demonstrations of intolerance 
towards race, sex, gender or religion, xenophobia, the use of stereotypes that are harmful or 
demeaning towards individuals and groups, or incite violence.  
Conceptual concerns aside, little attention has focused on identifying individuals or 
groups that are systematically targeted by these expressions online. As such, little is known about 
the extent to which these behaviors may represent a toxic discussion environment. I argue that it 
is fundamental to understand the differences between uncivil discourse used as a rhetorical asset 
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to justify and explain positions – albeit with antinormative intensity – and to offend others. Thus 
this study focuses on understanding how expressions of incivility or intolerance are used to target 
individuals and groups in online political talk – the conditions in which they are used to attack 
other participants in a discussion. The goal is to disentangle situations in which incivility might 
have rhetorical purposes in a discussion from when it is used to attack others, and the conditions 
in which particular groups and individuals are targeted by intolerant discourse – a more 
problematic behavior that is potentially damaging for democracy.  
While online discussions might often be uncivil, one cannot infer that participants are 
actively offending one another simply because they use uncivil rhetoric, particularly in the 
context of online comments on news websites or social media. Online comments are inherently 
public and are meant to be seen by others, which is not to say that their purpose is to invite 
discussion nor to engage in back-and-forth conversations (Reagle Jr 2016).  Thus, the fact that 
comments might be uncivil does not necessarily mean that people are being uncivil towards 
others. When faced with challenging perspectives or interpersonal disagreement (Stromer-
Galley, Bryant, and Bimber 2015; Mutz 2006), citizens may adopt a more heated tone and 
express their opinions in uncivil ways – which does not necessarily means they are offending 
each other (Rossini forthcoming). Incivility can also be used to call attention to an opinion, and 
has the effect of improving recall of arguments in a political discussion (Mutz 2016).  
As well, the perception of a homogeneous opinion climate might incentivize people to 
express their opinions with a more uncivil tone when they believe others will share their 
perspectives (Gervais 2014), and to target those who do not share their views– which may foster 
a sense of community and belonging in polarized contexts (Sobieraj & Berry 2011). However, 
more homogeneous discussion environments may also invite intolerance – as those who are 
targeted by this type of discourse are often not a part of the conversation (Wojcieszak 2011; 
Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). Moreover, the perception of a homogeneous opinion environment 
might also silence more diverse voices – a phenomena referred to as the spiral of silence 
(Gearhart and Zhang 2014; Matthes, Rios Morrison, and Schemer 2010). Social media users are 
more likely to self-censor and refrain from commenting on Facebook posts when they perceive 
the environment as hostile. Discussion hostility does not prevent participants from reading the 
comments, but the perception that their opinions may not be welcome increases the likelihood of 
self-censorship (Gearhart and Zhang 2014). 
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Research suggests that target, or focus, of uncivil discourse invites different 
interpretations. For instance, the public is more likely to classify a message as uncivil when it is 
focused on personal attacks, and less so when the focus is a political argument or policy 
(Muddiman, 2017). Name-calling and vulgarity are perceived as highly uncivil behaviors, while 
other types of incivility – such as pejorative speech or aspersions – are not (Kenski et al. 2017). 
Similarly, behaviors that call out personal conduct or personal character are significantly more 
likely to be perceived as uncivil than those related to political disagreement – e.g. attacking or 
disqualifying others’ arguments. Expressions of intolerance, however, are consistently perceived 
as extremely uncivil, suggesting that expressions such as racism, xenophobia, or threatens of 
physical harm, are not seen as acceptable behaviors (Stryker, Conway, and Danielson 2016). The 
target of incivility therefore is an important factor when evaluating different types of 
antinormative behavior. Nevertheless, few studies on incivility online have examined the extent 
to which it targets particular people or groups – for example, if it occurs in direct responses when 
two or more people are in interaction with each other or targeted at others who are not taking part 
in the conversation. As a result, the perspective that incivility is necessarily bad, or harmful, 
appears to be based upon the premise that it occurs as a part of the debate with intention to 
offend, or, at least, disrupt the conversation.  
While a few studies have considered targets of incivility, they have mainly focused in the 
binary between interpersonal and out-group incivility (Maia and Rezende 2016; Rowe 2015). 
This approach combines different potential targets and is not ideal for understanding the 
rhetorical functions of incivility in online discourse. Likewise, understanding the targets of 
intolerant discourse is crucial to diagnose the situations and conditions that may foster 
democratically harmful remarks. For instance, intolerant discourse targeted at other participants 
in a forum may have the purpose of silencing or disqualifying them, or their arguments, thus 
denying others of the right to be heard and treated as equals. Conversely, intolerant discourse 
targeted at those who are not a part of the conversation might suggest that participants feel that 
their opinions will be shared by others, and may contribute to further marginalize the targeted 
groups (Wojcieszak 2011).  
Considering that interpersonal incivility online is associated with heated political 
discussion, in which participants hold diverging views (Stromer-Galley et al. 2015), and 
intolerant remarks are more likely to be voiced in more homogeneous environments, I 
hypothesize: 
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H1) Uncivil comments are more likely to target discussion actors, and intolerant comments are 
more likely to target nondiscussion actors. 
 
 
The pervasiveness of incivility online is often associated with inherent features of 
computer-mediated communication, which lacks the social and nonverbal cues available in face-
to-face interactions. In the absence of such cues, users may feel disconnected from their real 
identities and are prone to express their opinions harshly without worrying about the 
consequences of their actions– a phenomenon labeled the “online disinhibition effect” (Suler 
2004). Online incivility also is associated with platform affordances such as the ability of 
participating anonymously in a discussion, and the ease to enter and leave discussions (Santana 
2014; Papacharissi 2004). Studies comparing anonymous and identified discussions in different 
online platforms show that identification may reduce the presence of uncivil behavior, as users 
tend to "save face" when using real names (Maia and Rezende 2016; Rowe 2015; Stromer-
Galley and Wichowski 2011). Conversely, studies focused on online deliberation have found that 
discussions in which participants have profiles or use real names tend to foster sincerity, 
rationality and quality of justification (Friess and Eilders 2015). Consistent with online 
disinhibition (Suler, 2004), the use of personal profiles, the maintenance of preexisting 
relationship ties, and the visibility of users’ actions on social networking sites such as Facebook 
should act as a social constraint that could prevent participants to be uncivil toward others in the 
network. Thus: 
 
H2) Users will be less likely to target other participants to the discussion on Facebook 
when compared to news websites.   
 
Intolerance can be manifested in different ways, such as inciting violence, using offensive 
stereotyping, and denying others of their freedoms or liberties; the latter can be practically 
translated into intolerance towards religion, individual preferences or opinions, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, or social status. Thus, the nature of intolerant discourse as a rhetorical act that 
denies equal status to people or groups due to personal characteristics and beliefs suggests that 
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minorities (political, social, racial etc) are particularly likely to be targeted by this type of 
discourse. 
 
H3) Comments targeted at minorities are more likely to be intolerant than uncivil.  
2 Internet Use and Political Context in Brazil 
With over 207 million inhabitants, Brazil is the fifth most populous country in the world, 
with 68% having internet access at home — a figure that stands at 83% in urban regions 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics [IBGE] 2016). Mobile internet use is nearly 
universal, reaching 93% of the population. Brazilians are particularly active internet users and 
accounted for over 102 million Facebook accounts in 2016 (Facebook 2016). The internet is 
increasingly becoming a major source of news in Brazil, with roughly 49% of the population 
using the internet main sources of information (IBGE 2016). 
Brazil is a presidential democracy with a multiparty system. The data for this study were 
collected in 2015, following the popular uprisings of 2013 and 2014 and the close election of 
Dilma Rousseff in the 2014 presidential elections. The narrow margin in the election revealed a 
divided country, and 2015 was marked by several public protests against the president, who was 
ultimately impeached in 2016. These protests, along with corruption scandals and the “Car 
Wash” Operation, an investigation that shed light into several illegal schemes between 
politicians from both sides of the spectrum and powerful businessmen, further shone the 
spotlight on the political sphere. Following the 2014 elections, much of the public debate around 
politics was polarized, but not just along partisan lines: The public generally perceived 
politicians as corrupt and untrustworthy. Considering the heated political context in Brazil, it is 
worth examining the extent to which politicians were targeted by online comments characterized 
by antinormative intensity. In other words, how much of the popular mistrust and dissatisfaction 
toward the political sphere translated into uncivil and intolerant expressions online? And in 
which conditions are politicians likely to be targeted by commenters? To explore these issues, I 
ask:  
RQ.1) In which conditions are comments more likely to target politicians with 
antinormative discourse? 
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Although intolerant discourse is more readily recognized when targeted at minorities or 
when taking the form of hate speech, the concept also encompasses threats to democratic norms 
and values – for instance, inciting violence, or government overthrown by force (Papacharissi, 
2004). Thus, while incivility towards politicians might be seen as acceptable online, and can be 
compatible with democratically relevant political talk insofar as it suggests that citizens are 
monitoring and criticizing their elected representatives (Zaller 2003), intolerance toward the 
political sphere is inherently harmful as it dismisses the basic values and norms that are the 
foundation of democratic societies (Gibson 2007). Thus: 
RQ.2) When citizens target politicians in their comments, are they more likely to be 
uncivil or intolerant?  
Finally, if citizens are indeed monitoring the political sphere when they target politicians 
in antinormative comments, these messages would likely display some level of explanation or 
elaboration of ideas and perspectives. As well, it is relevant to investigate the extent to which 
comments targeted at the political sphere signal disagreement, which would indicate a more 
heterogeneous discussion environment. Thus: 
RQ.3) What is the relationship between targeting politicians and justified opinion 
expression? 
RQ.4) What is the relationship between targeting politicians and disagreement?  
3 Methods 
This study focuses on public comments on news stories published by the Facebook page 
of Portal UOL, Brazil’s largest online news portal, and compares comments in news stories 
posted on the portal’s Facebook page to those in their original sources. In addition to its own 
newsroom, UOL hosts several prominent media outlets, such as Folha de São Paulo (the main 
national newspaper), regional newspapers, entertainment websites and opinion blogs written by 
journalists and analysts, which grants a variety of topics, stories, and perspectives in the sample. 
To compare stories shared on Facebook with news sources source, I followed links to each news 
outlet shared by Portal UOL – including hard news, entertainment news outlets, and political 
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blogs1 – and scraped all public comments in these outlets using a custom-made Python script2. 
Facebook comments were collected using Facepager, an open-source software designed for 
academic use (Junger and Keyling [2012] 2018). While it is not possible to make inferences 
about the demographics of users in either of these sites3, this approach aimed at keeping the 
topics of discussion constant among platforms.  
DiscoverText was used to collect stories posted by Portal UOL’s Facebook page over the 
course of six months. Then the pool of collected stories was sampled using the constructed week 
sampling technique, which ensures the variability of news on weekdays is properly represented 
in the sample (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2005). I sampled two constructed weeks to represent six 
months of the online news cycle (Connolly-Ahern, Ahern, and Bortree 2009). The initial sample 
contained 1,669 news stories posted by Portal UOL on Facebook over the course of two 
constructed weeks. Then, all posts from Portal UOL on Facebook were coded as either political 
or non-political news4, leading to a smaller sample of 229 stories. Lastly, stories without 
comments or with only one comment, as well as duplicated posts, were removed, leading to a 
total of 157 news stories. These stories were categorized in the following subtopics: formal 
politics, public policy (education, security, violence), celebrities (e.g., stories about celebrities 
engaged in political activities, or victims of discrimination), civil society, minorities, 
international affairs.   
The final sample of 157 stories led to a universe of 55,053 comments on Facebook and 
on news sites, with Facebook comments accounting for around 70% of this total (n = 38,594). 
Given the large number of comments, a random stratified sample of comments5 was created to 
account for the proportion between Facebook (70%) and comments on source (30%), and 
number of comments on each thread (e.g. threads with 1000, 100 or 10 comments were 
proportionally represented). Instead of pulling random messages, consecutive messages were 
                                               
1 These blogs are "opinion blogs" written by journalists and have similar moderation practices as the news websites. 
As such, those were aggregated with other news sources. 
2 The Python script to collect comments from Folha de São Paulo and UOL was written by Evandro L.T.P. Cunha, a 
doctoral student in the department of Computer Sciences at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. The script was 
further adapted by the author to collect comments from other news websites in the sample.  
3  The author contacted UOL and Folha de São Paulo to obtain demographics, but the data were not made available. 
4 The initial sample of posts was identified as political or nonpolitical, adopting a broad conception of political news 
that encompasses not only formal political affairs, but also topics such as education, security, violence, social 
programs, minorities, activism etc.  
5 Confidence interval: 99%; Margin of error: 1%.  
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sampled to enable the observation of threads, using a random number as a starting point. The 
final sample for analysis had a total of 12,337 comments.  
Content Analysis  
This study employs systematic content analysis (Neuendorf 2002) to classify public 
comments, with the codebook (available upon request) operating on two units of analysis: users 
and messages. Users were coded as identified or anonymous based on their names or aliases – 
that is, users were coded as identified if their screen name conveyed an identifiable name. 
Messages were coded to identify several discourse features, such disagreement, opinion 
expression, incivility, and intolerance.  
Messages were coded as disagreement when they: (1) diverged from the general tone of 
the discussion (considering the previous message in a thread as the baseline)6; or (2) explicitly 
diverged from another commenter in form of either name tagging or reply. Opinion expression 
was coded in two subcategories: opinions, which included any comment or remark that revealed 
a commenter's take on a topic; and justified opinion expression, coded when the commenter 
elaborated on an explanation to substantiate an opinion. This category aimed at identifying 
whether people made an effort of justifying or explaining their positions, without taking into 
account the quality of the argumentation.  
Messages coded as uncivil were further classified in subcategories, which includes 
different types of incivility (mockery, disdain, pejorative language, profanity, personal attacks 
focused on demeaning characteristics, personality, ideas, or arguments). Intolerant messages are 
those that convey a harmful intent towards people or groups. Messages identified as intolerant 
were coded in the following subcategories: xenophobia, racism, hate speech, violence, 
homophobia, religious intolerance, and attacks towards gender, sexual preferences or economic 
status. Intolerant and uncivil messages were also coded with respect to their targets – other users, 
political actors, people or groups featured on the news, the media (including journalists), political 
minorities, and others – a category used for less frequent targets. Uncivil or intolerant messages 
could also be unfocused, when coders were unable to identify a clear target. Targets were 
mutually exclusive.   
                                               
6 Because sequences of messages were analyzed instead of random comments in each news story, coders considered 
as disagreement when a comment explicitly disagreed with the previous messages. For example, if two comments are 
criticizing a given political party and another commenter follows up defending the political party, this message is 
coded as disagreement.  
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Content analysis was conducted by two independent coders, who performed an inter-
coder agreement test using approximately 5% (n = 636) of the sample after several rounds of 
codebook discussion, refinement, and testing. Intercoder reliability was measured using 
Krippendorff's alpha, and all categories were considered reliable (above .7). In spite of the 
challenges in identifying uncivil and intolerant discourse, these variables were highly reliable. 
For incivility, coders obtained a Krippendorf's alpha of 0.87 on news sources and 0.79 on 
Facebook, whereas the values for intolerance were of 0.84 on news sources and 0.89 on 
Facebook. Alphas for disagreement were of 0.89 and 0.82 for news sources and Facebook, 
respectively.  
4 Results 
The descriptive results of the content analysis show that uncivil discourse occurs 
frequently in online political talk: 37.8% of all 12,337 messages were coded as uncivil. 
Intolerance, however, was identified in only 7.8% of the sample. According to Table 1, 
politicians are the main target of uncivil discourse in online comments, but there are meaningful 
differences between the two platforms (X²(7) = 270.34, p <0.001). However, while the second 
main target of incivility on Facebook is the topic (or actors) mentioned in the news, the second 
main target of uncivil comments on news websites are other users.  
Table 1. Distribution of Targets per Platform (%) 
 Incivility Intolerance 
 Facebook page News  Facebook page News  
Unfocused 0.6 0.4 0.6 3.7 
Other users  12.0 16.4 0.5 11.1 
News topic and actors  25.6 7.5 39.6 31.5 
Political Sphere  48.5 62.4 10.5 23,5 
Minorities   4.2 1.3 40.7 16.0 
Journalist/news media 5.4 7.0 0.2 0.6 
Others 3.7 5.0 0.7 8.7 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Where targets of intolerance were concerned, a relationship between platform and target 
emerged (X²(7) = 106.19, p <0.01). Intolerant comments on the Facebook page were mostly 
targeted at minorities – such as LGBTQ, women, and the poor–, followed by the topic and actors 
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mentioned in the news (e.g., incarcerated people, teenagers involved in criminal activities7). and 
politicians, parties and institutions. In the news sources, the main targets were the same, but 
ranked differently. The topics and actors mentioned in the news pieces were the main focus of 
intolerant discourse, while the political sphere came in second place and minorities in third. 
While intolerant discourse is seldom directed at other participants to the discussion on Facebook 
(0.5%), this target is substantially more frequent on news websites.  
The frequencies of targets of incivility and intolerance suggest that these behaviors tend 
to focus on different targets and are also sensitive to the platforms where discussions take place. 
To further understand how these behaviors are manifested online, I ran three logistic regression 
models using the targets of interest as the dependent variables: other people in the forum, 
politicians, and minorities (Table 2). Because the category for targets was only coded when a 
message was classified as either uncivil or intolerant, the models are based on the subset of the 
data that was coded as either uncivil or intolerant (N = 5,135). In other words, because targets are 
not coded when a message is civil and/or tolerant, these were discarded for the analysis8. The 
models tested a set of discursive predictors, such as justified opinion expression, disagreement, 
and direct replies, as well as the platform where the comment was published (Facebook = 1). The 
topics of the news story were included in the models as control variables. As the subset of 
comments only contains messages that were either uncivil or intolerant, the variable uncivil in 
the model was dummy-coded (intolerant = 0, uncivil = 1).  
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Targets of Incivility and Intolerance  
Targets of Uncivil and Intolerant Discourse 
 Participants to discussion Politicians Minorities 
 
B Wald Exp (B) B Wald Exp (B) B Wald Exp (B) 
(Intercept) -6.071*** -8.91 0.002 -3.607*** -13.89 0.027 -4.397*** -4.29 0.012 
Justified Opinion -0.459*** -3.44 0.631 0.181* 2.20 1.198 0.026 0.17 1.026 
Uncivil (Intolerant = 0) 3.134*** 5.0 22.959 2.186*** 11.63 8.899 -3.356*** -16.08 0.034 
Facebook -0.155 -1.12 0.856 0.167* 1.89 1.181 0.122 0.55 1.129 
Reply 1.917*** 12.60 6.800 -0.536*** -4.27 0.585 0.029 0.11 1.029 
                                               
7 In 2015, the Congress was discussing a bill of law that would reduce the minimum age of criminal responsibility in 
Brazil from 18 to 16 years old. As a result, several news stories in the period referred to the bill of law, especially 
when teenagers were involved in criminal activities. To confirm the robustness of the findings, models were also tested 
with the full dataset containing messages that were neither uncivil nor intolerant. The results remained unchanged.  
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Disagreement 2.786*** 18.27 16.21 -1.886*** -13.06 0.151 -0.150 -0.54 0.861 
Story Topic          
Political News -0.522 -1.86 0.593 2.830*** 15.38 16.951 2.459** 2.37 11.692 
Minorities -0.358 -1.21 0.699 0.002 0.00 1.001 6.182*** 6.04 484.005 
Public Policy -1.098*** -2.84 0.333 0.603** 2.84 1.827 0.818 0.74 2.267 
Celebrities 0.617 1.29 1.853 0.194 0.51 1.214 5.781*** 5.34 324.127 
Nagelkerke PR22 0.574   0.485   0.488   
Note : * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
  
The first hypothesis focused on the extent to which uncivil and intolerant comments are 
targeted at other participants in a discussion, predicting that this would likely be associated with 
incivility rather than intolerance. The results support H1, with messages targeting others in a 
discussion being significantly more likely to be uncivil than intolerant. As well, when messages 
target others, they are less likely to be justified, and comments are more likely to address others 
in uncivil or intolerant remarks in the context of disagreement and when replying to others.  
Focusing on platform affordances, H2 predicted that the public nature of Facebook, 
where participants use their real identities and are visible in their networks, would constrain 
expressions of incivility. The hypothesis was not confirmed: Platform was not a significant 
predictor of uncivil and intolerant comments addressed toward other participants to the 
discussion on news website. 
H3 predicted that intolerant comments would be more likely to target minorities than 
uncivil ones, given that intolerant discourse is characterized by denying others of egalitarian 
status and respect. The hypothesis is supported: When comments target minorities, they are 
significantly more likely to be intolerant than uncivil, as indicated by the negative betas. Not 
surprisingly, minorities are more likely to be targeted by intolerant comments when they are also 
the topic of the news story and in politically relevant stories about celebrities who have protected 
status (e.g., being victims of racism or homophobia). However, the positive association between 
comments targeting minorities and stories covering formal politics is not trivial and suggests that 
part of the discussions around hard news might be focused on the relationship between 
politicians and minorities. 
The final set of research questions inquired about the extent to which politicians were 
targeted by uncivil or intolerant discourse. With regard to the topics of the news story, politicians 
were more frequently targeted by antinormative discourse in comments to stories about the 
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political sphere and policy-related topics (e.g. education, security, urban violence) (RQ1). 
Second, regarding the nature of antinormative discourse, comments targeted at politicians were 
significantly more likely to be uncivil than to display intolerance (RQ2). Third, consistent with 
the expectation that discussing politics is a proxy for monitoring the political sphere, uncivil and 
intolerant comments targeted at politicians were significantly more likely to contain justified 
opinions than those directed at other targets (RQ3). Finally, comments targeted at politicians 
were significantly less likely to display disagreement (RQ4) and to be a direct reply to other 
participants to the discussion, suggesting that these might be more associated to reactions to the 
news story than to genuine political debates in which participants address one another. 
5 Discussion 
This study sought to better understand how antinormative discourse is expressed online 
by examining the targets of uncivil and intolerant discourse, starting from a conceptual 
distinction between incivility (e.g, name-calling, pejorative speech, vulgarity, and aspersions), 
which may be acceptable in some online contexts, and intolerance (e.g. racism, sexism, and 
xenophobia), which threatens basic democratic values such as equality, plurality and freedom of 
expression and therefore undermine the benefits of political talk (Rossini forthcoming). 
Identifying the extent to which certain people and groups are targeted by these behaviors is 
crucial to better understanding the conditions in which online discussions threaten democratic 
norms, offend individuals, or are simply characterized by heated opinion expression.  
Prior research has identified ad hominem attacks as a frequent type of incivility online, 
suggesting that political discussions on news websites or social media might be toxic to its 
participants (Coe et al. 2014, Maia and Rezende 2016). Looking at specific targets of uncivil and 
intolerant discourse, this study finds that groups that are not participants to the discussions (such 
as politicians and minorities) are more likely to be targeted by both uncivil or intolerant 
discourse online. Nevertheless, it is important to unveil the dynamics at play when antinormative 
messages target participants within the discussion, as these might reflect discussions that are 
toxic to its participants. As hypothesized, interpersonal comments are significantly more likely to 
be uncivil than intolerant, which can be explained by research suggesting that extreme discourse 
(which may be intolerant) is more likely to circulate in echo chambers – that is, contexts in 
which participants feel that others will share their perspectives – and as such are more likely to 
target people or groups on the “other side” (Wojcieszak 2011; Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009).  
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As comments targeted at others are less likely to be justified and more likely to happen in 
the context of disagreement, it can be inferred that interpersonal incivility might be aimed at 
simply offending others, and not as a rhetorical device used to explain one’s positions in the face 
of disagreement (Herbst 2010). Thus, those who adopt uncivil rhetoric targeted at other 
discussants might not be interested in engaging in debates with the other side and instead are 
attempting to dismiss opposing voices by attacking them. Note, however, that this does not mean 
that these conversations are inherently offensive or toxic. As research on perceptions of incivility 
suggests, people generally perceive as acceptable when participants in a discussion are attacking 
others on the grounds of their positions and arguments (Kenski, Coe, and Rains 2017; Muddiman 
2017). Even when other discussants are targeted by antinormative discourse, it is possible that 
they do not perceive these behaviors as personally offensive if the messages signal political 
disagreement. As well, if those who are more frequently engaged in political discussions online 
tend to be more uncivil (Hmielowski et al. 2014), continued participation in these debates might 
influence participants’ perception of this behavior as being acceptable. 
Still in the realm of interpersonal incivility, the results challenged the hypothesis that the 
public nature of Facebook, where users are identified by their real names and pictures, would act 
as a constraint to antinormative behaviors (Suler 2004). Contrary to the hypothesis that social 
constraints would prevent participants from being uncivil toward others in a platform where 
these behaviors are visible to others in the network, as compared to the more anonymous 
environment of news websites, platform was not a significant predictor of interpersonal targets. 
This result challenges prior findings that show anonymity as one of the main predictors of online 
incivility; therefore, identification alone may be insufficient to prevent participants from being 
uncivil toward others in a discussion (Papacharissi 2004; Rowe 2015). A possible explanation is 
that Facebook users may be interacting with others outside of their own networks when 
commenting news stories, and therefore might not feel as constrained by their social ties to adopt 
uncivil rhetoric towards other discussants. In other words, while prior research on face-to-face 
political talk suggests that people refrain from engaging in disagreeable debates with those in 
their social circles (Mutz 2006), social media users might feel less constrained to engage in 
heated disagreement if they do not feel the pressure of social sanctions when commenting on 
news pages. Even though news commenters might imagine their friends and families to be the 
audiences of their comments (Kim, Lewis, & Watson 2018), they can also engage in 
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disagreeable debates with unknown others when commenting on news stories, which would 
explain the likelihood of experiencing and expressing interpersonal incivility in these situations.  
When looking at targets outside of the discussion, this study finds that intolerant 
comments are significantly more likely to be targeted at minorities, which might also contribute 
to silence their voices in these discussions (Matthes, Rios Morrison, and Schemer 2010). 
Notably, when minorities are targeted by antinormative discourse, these expressions are not 
associated with replies nor with disagreement, suggesting that these comments might be more 
reactive to the news stories than genuine discussions (Reagle Jr. 2016). Nonetheless, if minorities 
are more often targeted by intolerant discourse than by incivility, these messages can profoundly 
threaten democratic pluralism and equality, particularly when these comments are not challenged 
by disagreement. Taken together, these findings show that intolerant comments more likely to 
emerge in relatively homogeneous discussion threads, and that participants are more focused in 
attacking their targets than in engaging in conversations, as signaled by the reduced likelihood of 
replies.  
Finally, this study points to the political sphere as the main target of uncivil comments 
online. This result is not surprising given how the political sphere in Brazil has been facing 
increasingly polarized criticism and a loss of credibility under repeated charges of corruption. 
Consistent with research examining engagement with politicians on Twitter in the U.K., Greece, 
Germany, and Spain (Theocharis et al. 2016), the public might perceive that incivility is acceptable 
when talking about politics on social media. Contrary to interpersonal uncivil messages, comments 
targeted at the political sphere are likely to contain justified opinions, indicating that, despite of 
their heated rhetoric, those making uncivil comments towards politicians are likely to back their 
own claims instead of merely attacking. As such, those who target politicians with antinormative 
intensity online might be exercising their roles as monitorial citizens (Zaller 2003), publicly 
criticizing the political sphere. In this situation, incivility might be used as a rhetorical asset to call 
attention to one’s opinions and to signal dissatisfaction and outrage (Mutz 2016; Sobieraj & Berry 
2011). 
While this study contributes to our understanding of online incivility by expanding 
current research beyond the U.S. context, its findings cannot be extrapolated to other countries. 
Future research needs to focus on comparing online incivility and intolerance across different 
countries. As well, some of the dynamics observed in how particular groups and individuals are 
targeted by antinormative discourse might be related to the political climate in the country. 
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Finally, the coding scheme used in this study focused only on textual elements, not considering 
images, gifs, or emoticons, which are frequently used on social media. More research is needed 
to understand the role of visual forms of communication in online political talk, more broadly, 
and in uncivil or intolerant discourse. 
This chapter makes an important contribution to the understanding of how antinormative 
discourse is expressed online by focusing on the targets of uncivil or intolerant discourse and 
provides a better understanding of situations in which it should raise concerns with regards to its 
democratic values – namely, those in which intolerant discourse may emerge. When intolerant 
discourse targets minorities, for instance, it contributes to marginalize and exclude these groups 
from public discussion. If intolerant discourse is targeted at individuals in a discussion, it may 
signal a toxic environment for democratically relevant political talk, while intolerance targeted at 
political actors may suggest a threat to democratic institutions and procedures. These are 
problematic behaviors that need to be distinguished from uncivil opinion expression, or mild 
interpersonal attacks, in online political talk. 
Future research needs to further examine the conditions in which intolerant discourse 
emerges online, and how it may affect its targets – both directly and indirect. As well, future 
research needs to more actively consider the affordances of digital platforms – e.g. mentions, 
replies – to examine the extent to which uncivil discourse online signals a toxic conversational 
environment to its participants, or if the heated rhetoric around political issues that circulates 
online is an indicator that participants to these discussions perceive these behaviors as 
acceptable, particularly when they are not directly engaging with other peers.  
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